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Samantha Low Choy and Therese Wilson 
School of Mathematical Sciences, Queensland University of Technology 
Experts are increasingly being called upon to quantify their knowledge, particularly in situations 
where data is not yet available or of limited relevance. In many cases this involves asking experts 
to estimate probabilities. For example experts, in ecology or related fields, might be called upon 
to estimate probabilities of incidence or abundance of species, and how they relate to 
environmental factors. Although many ecologists undergo some training in statistics at 
undergraduate and postgraduate levels, this does not necessarily focus on interpretations of 
probabilities. More accurate elicitation can be obtained by training experts prior to elicitation, 
and if necessary tailoring elicitation to address the expert’s strengths and weaknesses. Here we 
address the first step of diagnosing conceptual understanding of probabilities. We refer to the 
psychological literature which identifies several common biases or fallacies that arise during 
elicitation. These form the basis for developing a diagnostic questionnaire, as a tool for 
supporting accurate elicitation, particularly when several experts or elicitors are involved. We 
report on a qualitative assessment of results from a pilot of this questionnaire. These results raise 
several implications for training experts, not only prior to elicitation, but more strategically by 
targeting them whilst still undergraduate or postgraduate students.  
1. Introduction 
Expert knowledge is valuable in many situations where empirical data is sparse or non-
representative especially in new investigations, for informing design of data collection or 
providing preliminary estimates. In ecology, expert knowledge has therefore informed many 
investigations where empirical data is lacking: delineating bioregional boundaries, assessing 
habitat preferences of rare species, and parameterizing complex biological demographic models 
(Ellison 1996; Low Choy et al. 2009). For instance expert knowledge has been used to 
characterise habitat preferences for input into Bayesian regression (O’Leary et al. 2008a), 
Bayesian classification trees (O’Leary et al. 2008b) and Bayesian networks (Smith et al. 2007). 
An important component of the substantive knowledge of ecological experts arises from 
direct experience such as fieldwork. They add to their knowledge through discussions with other 
experts and by distilling the scientific literature. Effective elicitation of expert opinions relies not 
only on this high level knowledge and understanding of the subject-matter, but also on their 
understanding of what is required by the elicitor from a quantitative perspective, including a basic 
understanding of probabilities. Hence detailed assessment of an expert’s understanding of 
probabilities would allow (1) training and (2) elicitation to be tailored to the individual expert. In 
the longer term such an assessment, if formative rather than summative, would also provide the 
basis for more strategic training of experts, and integrated into (3) future elicitation exercises, or 
more strategically (4) delivered in undergraduate or postgraduate courses. Not only would this 
help improve an expert’s ability to interpret the relevant scientific literature throughout their 
career, whilst they develop their expertise, it may also help motivate tertiary level students by 
illustrating the relevance of mastering probability concepts.  
This paper reports on preliminary efforts to diagnose an expert’s level of understanding 
of probability concepts, a necessary prerequisite of aims (1-4) above. We first identify some key 
probability concepts to be tested, thought to have significant effect on accurate elicitation of 
probabilities (Section 2). These form the aims of a questionnaire designed to test these concepts 
(Section 3). Since successful elicitation of probabilities must be assessed in a particular context 
(O’Hagan et al., 2006), we focus on a target population of experts who may be consulted about 
incidence or abundance of species, as related to environmental factors. We report on a qualitative 
assessment of results from a pilot study, whose intent is to refine the questionnaire for a major 
study involving a relatively large sample size comprising tens of ecological experts (Section 4). 
Finally we discuss some implications for teaching at undergraduate or postgraduate level (Section 
5).  
2. Probability concepts: Biases, Fallacies, Traps and Pitfalls 
Well-designed expert elicitation is one way to ensure rigour (O’Hagan et al., 2006). One 
framework for designing elicitation in ecology (Low Choy et al., 2009) highlights six main 
elements: determine the purpose (E1), formulate the statistical model (E3), appropriately target 
(E2) and encode (E4) expert knowledge, and design an accurate (E5) and repeatable elicitation 
protocol (E6). The way in which experts understand and communicate their probabilities has 
immense impact on the accuracy of information provided (E5), as well as comparability between 
opinions provided by several experts (E6). Within this framework the aspects most impacted are:  
(1) training experts in probability to provide a basis for eliciting their probability 
assessments on a particular topic (also affecting encoding E4); and 
(2) identifying strengths and weaknesses in the expert’s understanding and 
communication of probabilities and capitalize this knowledge to target the design of 
elicitation to manage measurement error (therefore affecting the goal E2).  
It is also common to suggest including a preliminary phase in elicitation to “condition” experts to 
the common biases (e.g. Spetzler and Stäel von Holstein 1975) or training experts vigorously on 
probability in the specific context of elicitation (e.g. O’Hagan et al. 2006). Nevertheless few 
details are generally provided on a structured approach to conditioning or training experts. 
Although optional in situations involving one elicitor and one or two experts (e.g. O’Leary et al. 
2008), a structured approach becomes mandatory in situations where an elicitation protocol may 
be applied to a wide range of experts, especially when there is more than one elicitor. 
Early research in psychology established that many biases arose from the use of particular 
“heuristics” used by people to assess probabilities (eg Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1983). These 
included: the availability bias depending on how easily information is recalled; the anchoring and 
adjusting bias where people start with an initial estimate and adjust it from there; and the 
representativeness bias where people tend to focus on a typical member of a population and 
extrapolate from there. The first two biases may quite easily be addressed prior to, or during, the 
elicitation process (Low Choy et al., to appear). The representativeness bias is related to several 
different misunderstandings about conditional probabilities including Bayes’ Theorem. Several 
misunderstandings have been identified as prevalent amongst lay people, and include the 
prosecutor’s and defendant’s “fallacies” common in legal contexts (e.g. Villejoubert and Mandel, 
2002). In addition diagnostic testing of probability reasoning has been performed in an 
introductory statistical modelling course (e.g. MacGillivray 2006, 2007). Both sources provide 
useful foundation for a questionnaire diagnosing probability concepts in ecologists. In this paper 
we develop a formal method for diagnosing how experts understand concepts about probabilities, 
rather than simply testing whether they understand the concept correctly. This is the first step 
towards finding a remedy via training or targeting design of elicitation (aims 1 and 2 above). 
2.1. Crocodile example  
Consider an example requiring interpretation of conditional probabilities. Suppose that a 
crocodile with particular markings bit a tourist, and that these markings are known to occur in 3% 
of the species. A crocodile is captured with these markings, and permission to terminate will only 
be given if there are “good” odds that the animal is guilty. This scenario is similar to one recently 
reported in the news (Murphy 2008), and may be of similar flavour to other situations 
encountered by ecological experts, particularly if they provide scientific evidence as experts in 
legal settings. The events of interest are whether the crocodile is marked (M) or not ( M ) and 
whether guilty (G) or not ( G ). This parallels the problem of determining the guilt of suspects in 
legal contexts depending on whether they match the evidence (Finkelstein and Levin 2001). 
Using mathematical notation, the core skill is to recognize that we need Pr(G|M), and 
since we know that at least the guilty one of the crocodiles is marked we have Pr(M|G)=1 




GGMMG =  Eqn 1 
If there are N suspect crocodiles, then ignoring the evidence on markings, the probability of guilt 
is Pr(G) = 1/N, and of innocence is Pr( G )=(N–1)/N. The remaining challenge is to interpret the 
statement “these marking occur in x% of the species”. In general, this probability could be 
interpreted as Pr(M). However if Eqn 1 is to be applied to a given group of N suspect crocodiles, 
then Pr(M) in this equation must measure the probability of marked crocodiles also occurring 
within this group of size N. Thus the probability of marked crocodiles amongst the N suspects is 
Pr(M|G)Pr(G) + Pr(M| G )Pr( G ) = 1.1/N + x (N–1)/N. This is equivalent to assuming that the x% 
mentioned as the incidence of markings in the general population is in fact be considered as 








 Eqn 2 
This provides a relationship between the assumed number of suspects (N) and p=Pr(G|M) as  
  (1 )   1N p px= − +  Eqn 3 
2.2. Visual presentation  
Despite the logical appeal of equations to 
mathematicians, in teaching contexts it has been 
shown that this style of presentation appeals to 
very few people. Visual representations, such as a 
2×2 table, a logic tree (Figure 1) or a matrix can 
be more useful to the vast majority of people 
(Ruscio 2003). This raises the first research 
question R1: Determine the types of formats 
preferred by the target population of ecological 
experts. In particular consider whether ecological 
experts provide more accurate responses when 
probabilities are expressed in terms of frequencies 
(e.g. Edgell et al. 2004, Giggerenzer and Hoffrage 
1995; Hoffrage and Giggerenzer 1998; Kynn 
2008).  
2.3. The Conjunction Fallacy 
In many situations linguistic uncertainty 
such as brevity or ambiguity in explanations can 
lead to confusion between joint and conditional 
probabilities, a form of underspecificity (Burgman 
2005). In this case, the statement “these marking occur in x% of the species”, could lead to 
interpretation of x =0.03 as the marginal probability Pr(M) for the suspects, which gives Pr(G|M) 
= 1/(Nx). For small N this can lead to an inconsistent set of probabilities, an issue difficult to 
detect “on the spot”. The fallacy arises with a small set of suspects, N<1/x, since this gives 
Pr(G|M)>1 and also Pr(M)=x is not then larger than the conjunction Pr(MG)=1/N. Hence research 
question R2: Will ecological experts avoid the conjunction fallacy? 
2.4. Prosecutor’s fallacy  
The prosecutor’s fallacy (Thompson and Schumann 1987) is so named since it aids the 
prosecution by over-estimating the probability of guilt. It may occur if the conditioning is 
misinterpreted by (R3a) setting a conditional probability equal to the probability of the condition, 
e.g. Pr(M| G ) = Pr( G ). In this case, this corresponds to incorrectly reasoning: since the chance of 





















Figure 1: A logic tree for visualizing conditional 
probabilities. Crocodile example. 
markings if innocent is Pr(M| G ) =  3%, then the probability of innocence (for marked crocodiles) 
Pr( G |M) is 3%, or equivalently that the probability of guilt (if marked) is Pr(G|M) = 1–Pr( G |M) 
= 97%. In fact, 97% equates to the distinctly different probability that there is no match when the 
suspect crocodile is in fact innocent Pr( M | G ).  
Note that Eqn 2 implies Pr(G|M) = 97% in the special case when the number of suspects 
N is 2. So intuitive thinkers may get confused if they have a “gut feeling” that the estimate could 
be correct (R3b). Thus research question R3 is: Do ecological experts err via the prosecutor’s 
fallacy? If so, are misunderstandings of type (a) or (b)? 
2.5. Inversion fallacy  
The prosecutor’s fallacy is mathematically equivalent to the “inversion” fallacy which 
occurs when the ordering of the conditioning is confused, setting Pr(M| G )=Pr( G |M). Thompson 
and Schumann (1987) notes that the prosecutor’s fallacy is true in the special case when the 
prosecutor assumes even prior odds of guilt before viewing the evidence, in contrast with the 
usual “legal” presumption of innocence until proven guilty “beyond all reasonable doubt”. 
Villejoubert and Mandel (2002) find that this error is consistently made by a large percentage of 
lay people, and does indeed result from switching the conditioning rather than neglecting base 
rates Pr(G) and Pr( G ) in the computation, as suggested by others (e.g. Evans et al. 2002). This 
extends the third research question to R3: If the prosecutor’s fallacy occurs, is it due to (a) 
equating Pr(M| G ) to Pr( G ); (b) inverting the logic by setting Pr(M| G )=Pr( G |M); (c) 
neglecting base rates; (d) assuming the prior odds of guilt before viewing evidence is one half; (e) 
assuming the number of suspects N=2; or (f) a desire to conclude the crocodile is guilty?   
2.6. Defendant’s fallacy  
The defendant’s fallacy is so-called since it over-estimates the probability of innocence in 
favour of the defendant. It may occur if subjects dilute the evidence on marking, despite how 
rarely it occurs in the population at large (Thompson and Schumann 1987).  In this case, they may 
start by choosing a very large reference region, e.g. Northern Queensland. If there are 40,000 
other crocodiles in Northern Queensland, then they can logically state that they expect 1,200 of 
these to be marked, leading to the seemingly logical conclusion that there is a chance of 1 in 
1,200 that the captured crocodile is guilty. The fallacy arises from a mis-specification of the 
probability space. It fails to take into account that there was a much smaller group of suspect 
crocodiles within the vicinity of where the tourist was bitten, leading to a much reduced 
likelihood that one of the suspects was also one of the rare marked crocodiles.  
Suppose the number of suspects was more realistic: a local scientist estimates that at most 
100 crocodiles inhabit the river where the tourist was bitten. Since crocodiles are quite territorial 
they are unlikely to move around much outside of breeding season or floods. Since the probability 
(p) is related to the number of suspects (N) via Eqn 3, this would lead to a much larger chance of 
one in four that the suspect is indeed guilty given the evidence of marking, with p = 0.25. Thus 
research question R4 is: Are ecological experts susceptible to the defendant’s fallacy? If so, can 
this be attributed to accepting an inappropriate reference population? 
2.7. Naughty Noughts and defining the Baseline Population 
The defendant’s fallacy is closely related to the “naughty noughts” (Austin and Meyers, 
1996) or “excess zeros” (e.g. Martin et al. 2005) problem in ecology. This occurs when an 
inappropriately large reference region is used, thus diluting the probability of presence of a 
species. Excess absences [or presences] may map to large [or small] geographic areas of absences 
that will dilute [or inflate] estimated probabilities of presence. To account for environmental 
constraints, e.g. to ensure the species’ environmental envelope excludes areas uninhabitable by 
the species, a solution is to redefine the baseline population (Austin and Meyers 1996; Murray et 
al. 2008) or model (Martin et al., 2005; O’Leary et al., unpublished manuscript).  
Other elements important in reducing biases include: defining spatio-temporal extent and 
scale to reduce underspecificity; and recognizing important pre-conditions or sub-populations to 
reduce context dependence (Burgman 2005). In elicitation the statistical model should isolate the 
variable that experts know something about (Spetzler and Stäel von Holstein 1975). This often 
requires decomposition of the problem by adding extra “hierarchy” which highlights important 
pre-conditions (Low Choy et al. 2009). For example, the probability of occupancy may depend on 
detection of a species when it is or is not present (Martin et al. 2005). Missing pre-conditions may 
manifest when important sub-populations are not identified. Thus experts may need to report 
probabilities separately for different regions (Murray et al., in review).   
To address these baseline biases, Girotto and Gonzalez (2001) recommend asking 
subjects to explicitly communicate both the numerator and the denominator in the ratio (odds) 
defining a conditional probability. Kynn (2008) recommends that explanations are provided for 
any extreme probabilities (close to zero or one), potentially revealing tacit assumptions. These 
issues complement research question R4 to define R5: Are experts aware of the need to 
appropriately define the baseline population, by (a) identifying important ecological constraints 
(e.g. species envelope); (b) defining the spatio-temporal extent and scale; and recognizing 
important (c) pre-conditions or (d) sub-populations that modify the probability of interest?  
2.8. The importance of joint probabilities  
Some visual representations encourage assessment of joint probabilities rather than 
conditional probabilities, which can be important. Edgell et al. (2004) note the inversion fallacy 
(Section 2.4) is less prevalent when people are introduced to information expressed as joint rather 
than conditional probabilities. Girotto and Gonzalez (2001) encourage evaluation of joint 
probabilities where all possibilities for at least one condition are considered, e.g. estimate both 
Pr(MG) and Pr(M G ). This ensures that the full range of possibilities of at least one factor (here 
G and G ) are considered in conjunction with the other factors. Hence research question R6: 
Confirm whether reasoning improves when guided to evaluate joint probabilities first.  
3. Questionnaire design 
3.1. Principles 
This questionnaire seeks to diagnose and evaluate how ecological experts think and 
communicate about probabilities when asked questions in particular formats. It was important to 
emphasize to respondents that there are therefore no right or wrong answers, and that it may be 
that the wording or presentation of questions may make it difficult for experts to answer in the 
expected way. Information targeted by the questionnaire falls in three main areas: an introduction 
to set the scene and frame the topic; assessing probabilistic reasoning and skills; and relevant 
background information such as risk attitudes and previous statistical training which may impact 
their reasoning. Risk attitudes are important and could conceivably modify all probability 
assessments provided by an individual expert. Questions on training on statistics and probability 
throughout their education provide important context and allow experts to identify gaps, both 
important for future design of training. In this paper we focus on the core questions addressing 
comprehension of conditional probabilities. 
Recognizing that different experts think in different modes (Low Choy et al., submitted), 
probabilistic thinking can be assessed using problems that are presented in different formats: (i) 
verbal descriptions with information in numeric form, (ii) in tabular format, or (iii) using a map. 
The verbal presentation targets experts with strong aural learning and thinking modes. Tabular 
formats are designed to appeal to experts with experience in spreadsheeting or with strengths in 
visual learning and thinking, in concrete rather than abstract contexts. Maps provide an alternative 
visual focus, and may trigger kinetic memories (i.e. of physically doing things) in ecological 
experts with a strong background in fieldwork (Denham and Mengersen 2007) or familiarity with 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS).  
The verbal format may encourage intuitive thinking across all types of experts, however 
they may be susceptible to linguistic bias. These questions tend to be more open-ended so have 
higher potential to reveal the expert’s thinking processes, depending on the skill of an interviewer 
in divining this information. In contrast the tabular and map-based formats provide more specific 
information, but may appeal to experts with greater numeric literacy. Specific follow-up questions 
may be used to reveal particular types of thinking.  
Either approach may be used to provide different cues, for example on: format and 
expressing probabilities in terms of frequencies, percentages, ratios or proportions (R1); or 
encouraging evaluation of joint before conditional probabilities (R5). Regardless of the format of 
presentation, questions are designed to assess whether the expert is susceptible to: (R3) the 
prosecutor’s or inversion fallacy, with five potential causes; (R4) the defendant’s fallacy or (R5) 
other biases due to weaknesses in defining the baseline, with four postulated causes.  
3.2. Target population of experts 
Successful elicitation of expert knowledge can only be assessed within the area of 
expertise (O’Hagan et al., 2006). For specificity, we therefore target experts, in ecology or related 
fields, who might be called upon to estimate probabilities of incidence or abundance of species, 
and how this relates to environmental factors.  
In addition to outlining a preliminary rationale, aim and design of a questionnaire for 
diagnosing how these ecological experts learn and think about probabilities, this paper reports on 
a pilot exercise to test a preliminary version of a questionnaire. Although the final questionnaire is 
intended for delivery in written form, this first pilot was delivered via interview. This form of 
delivery allowed the interviewer to: control the order of questions and note the need for additional 
follow-up questions either for clarification or to guide thinking; assess the amount of time taken 
on each question; note the “comfort” level for different question formats.  
Thus three phases are proposed for development of the questionnaire. In phase I (some 
aspects reported here) we propose an initial design, and pilot this on a small though diverse group 
of experts, to assess the discriminatory ability of questions to detect a variety of conceptual 
misunderstandings. For phase II, the initial design is refined, and tested on at least two more 
discipline-specific groups of experts, to provide an indication of the need to tailor the 
questionnaire to specific disciplines. This will provide a final questionnaire in phase III that can 
be used to diagnose expert knowledge prior to a specific elicitation exercise, train experts, and 
redesign elicitation to account for their strengths and weaknesses.      
The small group of six experts consulted during the pilot phase I was selected to cover a 
range of disciplines: two ecologists with varying expertise on vegetation or animal species in 
several ecosystems; two environmental scientists with expertise either in assessing or reporting 
across a wide range of species and ecosystems; a wildlife veterinarian with expertise in 
epidemiology of animal diseases across various species; and an ecologist with research interests 
on species-environment interactions who also teaches statistics.  
3.3. Content of questions 
Experience in statistical education provided a conceptual template for questions in verbal 
(Q3 on crocodiles) or tabular format (Q4 on deer, Q6-Q7 on foliage projected cover) that can be 
tailored to the elicitation topic (e.g. MacGillivray 2006,2007). Experience in eliciting information 
on this topic supported by map-based software tools (Low Choy et al., to appear) helped 
formulate the map-based question (Q5). A word problem (Q3 on crocodiles, similar to Section 2) 
reflects the type of everyday information that an expert may encounter whilst reading the 
newspaper, and is similar to questions in the literature on fallacies (e.g. Thompson and Schumann 
1987). Hence verbal, tabular and map-based presentations are tested (R1). 
Several situations are considered for assessing skills in conditional probabilities, and 
reflect realistic situations thought to be commonly encountered by the target ecologists: (I) 
determining presence of an ecological factor (e.g. guilt) given evidence; (II) characterizing how 
species presence relates to one or two environmental factors; and (III) predictive ability of 
species’ environmental niche or habitat models. A verbal question (Q3) based on the example in 
Section 2 concerned whether a crocodile was guilty given it matched a description (Situation I), 
and was used to assess whether the expert was coherent (R2) or committed the prosecutor’s and 
defendant’s fallacies (R3-4). A tabular question (Q4) focussed on whether environmental 
managers mentioned a deer species’ preference for two types of habitat factors (Situation II), and 
helped assess benefits of tabular format (R1); detect impacts of linguistic ambiguity (R2), 
especially on distinguishing joint from conditional probabilities (R6); assess the inversion fallacy 
(R4) and some aspects of baseline biases (R5). The map-based question (Q5) required experts to 
assess environments preferred by a gecko species (Situation II) and targeted baseline biases (R5). 
A tabular question (Q6) addressed similar though fewer questions to another question (Q4), but in 
the more abstract context of assessing a model’s predictive ability in discerning foliage projected 
cover (Situation III). A verbal question (Q7) addresses similar questions to another (Q6) in the 
same context (Situation III), but provides cues in terms of percentages rather than counts. This 
presentation of the problem requires experts to apply Bayes’ Theorem or its visual analogues 
(such as a decision tree) to obtain a solution. In particular it was interesting to see whether experts 
utilized the tabular format that was used to present information for previous questions, to help 
answer this question. All tabular questions provided information in terms of frequencies.  
Comparisons between questions tested whether presentation of information as conditional 
probabilities (Q3,Q7), joint probabilities (Q4,Q6) or visual frequencies (Q5) affected evaluation 
(R6), in part due to format; and whether some experts had an intuitive (Q3,Q5) rather than logical 
(Q4,Q6-Q7) grasp of conditional probabilities (R1).    
4. Results from a pilot study 
4.1. Verbal question (Q3) addressing prosecutor’s and defendant’s fallacy 
The verbal format of the crocodile question (Q3) provided information in the form of the 
reverse conditional probability to that required (x), and some frequencies relevant to baseline 
rates. However key information on the number of suspects was not provided. This information 
was identified as important by half of the pilot experts at the outset and by the other half later 
during the question. Although two experts just wondered about N, two experts were concerned 
with how large N was and one with how large the region was, and one provided an example 
N=100. This suggests a tendency for experts to eventually realise that spatio-temporal and 
baseline and reference population are important (R5), so it is important to assess the timing of the 
realisation.  
All experts were quickly able to identify the prosecutor’s fallacy in the verbal context 
(Q3), with two highlighting the reversal of logic, one empathising with the misunderstanding, one 
person stating the correct interpretation of the probability of marking given guilty. However 
although one person identified that the statement was incorrect, their explanation revealed the 
inversion fallacy (3% chance of innocence). Two thirds of the experts fell prey to the standard 
defendant’s fallacy, despite one of these noting that only local crocodiles should be considered at 
the outset. 
4.2. Tabular questions (Q4,Q6)  assessing inversion fallacy and baseline biases. 
Using a tabular format of presenting a 2x2 table in a standard context (Q4), all experts 
reported the marginal probability correctly, and some experts noted the ambiguous wording 
affecting their estimates of the two joint probabilities. All experts estimated the first conditional 
probability (by column) correctly, whilst only two thirds estimated the second conditional 
probability (by row) correctly, although this could be due to the similar row and column totals (56 
and 58 respectively). Altogether this indicates that one question each on a marginal, joint, row 
and column conditional probability should be sufficient to capture most variation in thinking. In 
Q4 the number of times that factors are “mentioned” by managers is reported, rather than the 
number of managers mentioning a factor. This issue with the underlying support was noted by 
one third of the experts. Only one expert noted that one of the questions was erroneously referring 
to the number of managers rather than the number of mentions. 
For the other tabular format question in a different context (III) (Q6), one expert made a 
mistake and reported a conditional probability instead of the desired marginal. Half the experts 
accurately reported the row-based conditional probability, with one interpreting it as a joint 
probability, one reporting the odds of high to low, and one committing the inversion fallacy. Two-
thirds of experts accurately estimated the column-based conditional probability, with the 
remainder estimating a joint instead. 
Taken together results from the tabular format questions indicated that linguistic 
uncertainty was a key element (R1). The sampling units in Q4 were consider ambiguous or 
unusual by most experts, and led to longer response times. Errors increased with the more abstract 
context (R1) of model performance (Q6). Errors seemed higher for the row-based conditional 
probabilities (consistent across Q4,Q6), indicating potential sensitivity to orientation of tabular 
format (R1b). The order of marginal, joint and conditional probabilities may assist some but not 
all experts (R6). These trends need to be investigated further, and confirms the need to present 
tabular information in these two different contexts (I,III), both commonly encountered by the 
target ecological experts. 
4.3. Map-based question (Q5)  assessing baseline biases. 
All expects commented that they enjoyed (R1) the map-based presentation (Q5). All but 
one expert provided an estimated (joint) probability over the entire grid, explaining that there was 
no evidence to support limiting the area of concern in any way. One third of experts suggested 
that a constraint to administrative boundaries was likely to be flawed although difficult to discern 
from the available information. This suggests that one sub-question on constraints would be 
sufficient in the final questionnaire. However it is possible that this question is perhaps not 
sufficiently discriminating to detect baseline biases (R5), so that more challenging questions 
ought to be included.  
4.4. Verbal question (Q7)  assessing Bayes Theorem. 
The final verbal question (Q7) required application of (a) the total law of probability to 
evaluate the marginal probability Pr(M) and (b) Bayes Theorem to evaluate an inverse 
conditional, with information provided in terms of probabilities conditional on guilt G. Without 
exception, all experts found this question, particularly evaluation of the inverse conditional 
probability, difficult to do on the spot, e.g. commenting “My brain hurts!” or “Brain is 
fibrillating”. Experts either made a short cursory effort or else attempted the question at least 
twice, with a substantial break in between. Half the experts took 20-25 minutes to arrive at their 
answers, and the one person who took the longest (30 minutes) got both answers “correct”.  
Half of the experts correctly applied the law of total probability to quantify the marginal 
based on the provided information in terms of conditional probabilities. One expert did not 
recognize a marginal or inverse conditional was required, and instead reported a conditional for 
both questions and one person reported a base rate. People encountered even more difficulties, 
and spent most their effort on part (b). One person calculated the inverse conditional probability 
correctly, and another third of the experts calculated the numerator correctly but then misapplied 
the denominator. Two people reported 90% which was the inverse conditional probability. Only 
one person adopted the tabular format of the previous questions (Q4,Q6) to work out the inverse 
probability. Overall these results suggest heavily that this type of question should be avoided in 
“live” situations such as just prior to or during elicitations, although it may prove highly 
informative and discriminating in assessing probabilistic literacy of students (R3,R4). These 
results suggest that the question could target knowledge of Bayes’ Theorem (R3,R4) better by 
using a less abstract context, even more straightforward than that used in Q4. 
5. Discussion 
In general these preliminary results suggest that the presentation and format may have a 
large impact on experts’ ability to recognize and outline the solution to obtain the desired 
probabilities. Results from the tabular format (Q4,Q6) provide weak evidence that some experts 
are more prone to the inversion fallacy than others. However no experts performed this fallacy for 
the verbal question (Q3) in the popular news context (I), whereas several experts erred in this way 
using verbal question (Q7) on the more abstract context (III). This provides a useful indication 
that the inversion fallacy is indeed sensitive to format, with some experts more susceptible than 
others. The map-based format of Q5 did not diagnose any sources of baseline bias. Thus either the 
format is highly successful or the questions need to be made more complicated. Current 
indications are that the map-based format (Q5) helped avoid baseline biases (R5) which were 
more likely to occur as the defendant’s fallacy (R4) in the verbal format (Q3) and to a lesser 
extent in the tabular formats (Q4,Q6). More extensive research is required to determine the extent 
to which format or context can improve experts’ abilities to avoid baseline biases. None of the 
pilot experts exhibited the conjunction fallacy (R2) in the one question able to detect it (Q3), 
signifying extra research is required to determine if other questions may detect this problem 
better, or if the problem is not as prevalent as first suspected.   
Thus preliminary results support continuing with diagnosis of fallacies in several formats 
as well as both a straightforward context (ecological response to two factors) and a more abstract 
context (predictive performance of models). This suggests retaining (with minor refinements) 
questions Q3, Q4 and Q6 in verbal and tabular formats, targeting the prosecutor’s, defendant’s, 
and conjunction fallacies as well as preference for joint rather than conditional probabilities. 
However indications are that more difficult concepts such as calculating marginal and inverse 
probabilities from conditional probabilities (rather than joint frequencies) as in Q7 should be 
assessed in simpler contexts.  
In phases II and III with more homogeneous target populations of experts, it will be 
possible to determine how consistent these patterns and trends are. Larger sample sizes will 
provide more power to detect emerging patterns across the target population whilst also allowing 
for examination of the individual susceptibility of experts via relationships between questions.  
6. Implications for undergraduate and postgraduate training for ecologists  
Many ecological experts consulted for elicitation have had little formal training in 
understanding probability concepts, and little practice in quantifying their knowledge in the form 
of probabilities. Relevant concepts may have been encountered but not explored in a context 
relevant to elicitation. Probability may be introduced in the final two years of high school, in 
courses on philosophy or mathematics (statistics or probability component), and paid only cursory 
attention in a modern introductory statistics course at undergraduate and postgraduate levels 
which focuses on data analysis.  The statistics education reform movement which has improved 
the teaching of data analysis, has so far had little positive impact on the teaching of probability 
concepts (MacGillivray, 2008). In contrast, scientific articles more accessible to ecologists post-
graduation are increasingly addressing fundamental probability concepts, especially with 
proliferation of Bayesian statistics (e.g. Malakoff 1999; Ellison et al., 2004).  
Despite this limited training, experts have been quantifying their knowledge for input to 
models for decades; for review in ecological context see Low Choy et al. (2009). Some 
disciplines have recognized the need for appropriate training at undergraduate level, including 
interpretation of: evidence in a legal context (e.g. Finkelstein and Levin 2001), medical diagnostic 
tests  risk assessments (e.g. Burgman 2005), and assessment of model performance via sensitivity 
and specificity (Fielding and Bell 1997). This paper provides preliminary evidence of this gap in 
the training of ecologists who may be called upon to quantify their expert advice.  
This preparation provides the foundations for improved understanding, implementation 
and interpretation of statistics more generally. Classical statistics rests on clear understanding of 
probabilities conditioning on the null hypothesis (e.g. p-values, confidence intervals, significance 
levels and power). Conditional probabilities underpin Bayes Theorem, leading to the central tenet 
of Bayesian statistics and a focus on the probability distributions of model parameters 
conditioning on the data observed.  By addressing the gap in understanding how to apply 
probability concepts, the next generations of ecologists may be better prepared to explore and 
communicate their knowledge quantitatively, often as probabilities, with estimates qualified by a 
quantification of their uncertainty.  
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